Evidence that Attentional Stance Shift is Learned Rapidly, Reliably Induces Mindfulness, and Constitutes a Distinctive Marker of Cognitive Process

Mindfulness is shown to have a range of benefits for mental health and well-being (e.g., Eberth & Sedlmeier, 2012; Goyal et al., 2014; Khoury et al., 2013, 2015; Querstret et al., 2020; Sumantry & Stewart, 2021), yet there is insufficient precision in conceptualizations of mindfulness to objectively differentiate its various forms. For example, EEG is as yet unable to empirically distinguish between distinctly different practices associated with traditional mindfulness such as focused awareness and open monitoring meditation practices (e.g., Garcia et al., 2024). Mindfulness meditation techniques in turn differ substantially from cognitive mindfulness, a self-reflexive thoughtfulness described as a form of metacognition (e.g., Andrei et al., 2016; Haldeman & Hartelius, 2022; Philipp et al., 2020). If specific categories of mindfulness are to be objectively assessed, greater precision is needed in defining the underlying cognitive processes.

One approach to this task would be the identification of perceptible somatic markers of cognitive process that would be less vulnerable than verbal instructions to the vagaries of semantics. For example, instructions to “let go” of thoughts and emotions (e.g., Tobin, 2016) could be interpreted by one person as a shift in focus of attention from inner conversation to sensate experience, while another might take it as an invitation to dissociate from sensate experience. Identifying such perceptible markers of cognitive process entails several challenges. First, potential markers must be both empirically demonstrated to correlate with cognitive processes and reliably perceptible as body-located sensations; somatic markers proposed by Antonio Damasio were empirically verified but not necessarily detectable in experience (Bechara & Damasio, 2005; Damasio et al., 1991). Second, increased specificity is required in the phenomenology of subjective experiences; among several such attempts (e.g., Lutz et al., 2002; Pekala & Kumar, 2000; Timmermann et al., 2023; Varela, 1996; Walsh, 1995), there is as yet only modest evidence of sense-accessible and empirically verifiable cognitively relevant somatic markers (e.g., Lutz et al., 2002; Nelson et al., 2020; Pekala et al., 2010). Third, careful distinction must be made between introspection—unstructured internal reflection on thoughts and feelings that has long been discredited (e.g., Hurlburt & Heavey, 2001; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977)—and specific internal sensations based on interoceptive awareness, some of which may be reliable markers of cognitive process. That Wilhelm Wundt made this distinction between introspection, which he rejected, and internal sensation, which he utilized, has been demonstrated by Danziger (1980).

Hartelius et al. (2023) proposed that internal sensation be used to identify cognitively relevant somatic markers of mindfulness states that accord with traditional and contemporary descriptions of mindfulness. There is preliminary evidence that self-regulation of attentional stance—the internal sensation of self-location—can be used to manage one’s global cognitive state (Hartelius et al., 2022). Change in global cognitive state refers to an alteration in the cognitive environment such that psychological capacities and resources are prioritized in a different manner (Hartelius, 2015; McKilliam, 2020). Cognition in this context is viewed broadly, including the full spectrum of an organism’s knowledge and information-processing functions (whether or not these are within awareness). The concept of global cognitive state is preferred to more conventional terms such as state of consciousness, since there are numerous definitions of consciousness and little consensus on how any of these could be usefully divided into distinct, measurable states.

Attentional stance is a recently developed psychological construct that refers to variations in the location of the receptive seat of attention—the bodily location where the attending self is felt to be located (Hartelius & Goleman, 2016; Hartelius et al., 2022). This internal source or seat of attention is distinct from what attention is directed towards—the external target of attention. Together these two parameters comprise the attentional stance. Philosophers of the classic era described an equivalent of attention as visual rays that emanated from the eyes and reflected information back to the viewer about objects at which it was directed (Lindberg, 1971), thereby assuming that the experience of attending to stimuli always originated from the same location. Psychological research has often described focal attention as a spotlight that similarly assumes focus on a target from a uniform locus of origin (e.g., Eriksen & St. James, 1986; Heitz & Engle, 2007). This misses the fact that attention has an adjustable source in the body from which it is perceived to originate, much in the way a fireman can hold their hose down by the waist or over the shoulder.

A change in this adjustable seat of attention creates a change in attentional stance. Just as one’s relationship to objects in the environment changes according to whether viewing is done from ground level or a tenth floor balcony, a shift in attentional stance results in a different attentional perspective and a changed relationship with the target of attention. Participant reports of experienced self-location have commonly located the sense of self in the head (Bertossa et al., 2008), in the heart area (Fetterman & Robinson, 2013), or distributed between the head and chest (Alsmith & Longo, 2014; Anglin, 2014; Hanley et al., 2021; Limanowski & Hecht, 2011; Starmans & Bloom, 2012; van der Veer et al., 2018, 2019). In another approach to assessing self-location, stimuli became associated with the self when presented near the head or the upper torso, but not when presented at other body locations (Schäfer et al., 2019).

Attentional stance has been shown to affect global cognitive state, emotional temperament, self-construal, social and moral attitudes, and social functioning, and repeated deployment of the same attentional stance has been shown to create reliably similar patterns of brain activation (Hartelius et al., 2022). As such, attentional stance appears to be a key variable in self-regulation processes such as mindfulness. Given that shifts in attentional stance can be facilitated by regulation of self-location (Hartelius et al., 2023), it is noteworthy that Dambrun et al. (2023) have reported decreased self-location in the head and increased self-location in the torso and/or limbs in mindfulness meditators using body scan and breathing meditation practices.

Based on a comparison between EEG results and some traditional descriptions of Buddhist meditation, it has been suggested that the attentional stance in which the seat of attention is felt to be situated diffusely in the abdomen is likely similar to a global cognitive state cultivated by the practice of vipaśyanā (Hartelius et al., 2023; Fig. 1). EEG measurements of this attentional stance were found to correlate strongly with EEG patterns associated with three positive emotions, including gratitude and serenity (Hartelius et al., 2022), both of which have been identified as low-arousal positive affect states (Cordaro et al., 2024). This suggests that the diffuse abdominal stance induces a low-arousal positive affect state (LAPA), which has been associated with both mindfulness and positive mood (McManus et al., 2019, 2024).

Given the simplicity and precision of attentional stance exercises, a mindfulness protocol based on this approach would likely provide a more reliable induction for the purposes of neural measurement. Considering that participants in our prior study were able to self-regulate their attentional stance rapidly and with relative ease (Hartelius et al., 2022), it should be the case that brief instruction and a short practice session in entering a diffuse attentional stance in the abdomen would result in an increase in mindfulness and mindfulness-related behaviors such as positive emotion (Amutio et al., 2015) and interoception (Cebolla et al., 2016; Chiesa et al., 2013), as well as a decrease in stress (Khoury et al., 2015).

The following three studies were conducted to test for the expected behavioral effects using a simple pre-test post-test design. Study 1 assessed for initial evidence of beneficial impact on stress and mindfulness in 15 meditation novices after a brief training and short practice session in a diffuse abdominal attentional stance. Previous research had predicted that use of this attentional stance bore similarity to vipaśyanā-style mindfulness meditation (Hartelius et al., 2023), a tradition often represented in contemporary research by Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR; Chiesa & Serretti, 2010; Kabat-Zinn, 2003). MBSR reflects this Buddhist meditation tradition based on the vipaśyanā origins of MBSR’s central practice, the body scan (Anālayo, 2020), and has been referred to as the “gold standard model” of a mindfulness-based intervention due to its standardized format (Reive, 2019; Van Dam et al., 2018). As an initial evaluation of this predicted similarity, Study 2 recruited 15 MBSR practitioners in order to compare the behavioral effects of short practice sessions of MBSR meditation with those of a diffuse abdominal stance. Study 3 attempted to replicate and extend the findings of Study 1 with a second group of 15 meditation novices by assessing the impact on stress and mindfulness of brief training and a short practice session with the diffuse abdominal attentional stance, but adding assessments of interoceptive awareness and the positive emotions of gratitude, contentment, and compassion. These results, if promising, would indicate the value of future study with a more complex study design.